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Abstract 
We study earnings and income inequality in Britain over the past two decades, including the 
period of relatively “inclusive” growth from 1997-2004 and the Great Recession. We focus 
on the middle 90%, where trends have contrasted strongly with the “new inequality” at the 
very top. Household earnings inequality has risen, driven by male earnings – although a 
‘catch-up’ of female earnings did hold down individual earnings inequality and reduce 
within-household inequality. Nevertheless, net household income inequality fell due to 
deliberate increases in redistribution, the tax and transfer system’s insurance role during the 
Great Recession, falling household worklessness, and rising pensioner incomes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
After increasing sharply through the 1980s, income inequality in Britain has fallen across 
most of the distribution over the past two decades, although incomes towards the very top 
have continued to pull away. The fall in inequality across most of the distribution largely 
reflects two episodes: a period of ‘inclusive growth’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s when 
inequality fell while incomes were growing strongly (see Figure 1), and the Great Recession 
and its aftermath. Both of those episodes stood in contrast to trends in income inequality in 
the United States (which increased over the same periods), despite similar upwards trends in 
male wage inequality in both countries. This paper provides a thorough account of why 
income inequality in Britain has behaved in this way, examining the transmission 
mechanisms between male wages and net household incomes - specifically changes in female 
wages, hours of work, the combination of individual earnings patterns within households, 
taxes, and unearned incomes. 
Figure 1. Real household incomes in Great Britain at the 10
th
, 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles 
(1994 = 100) 
 
Note: Household incomes have been measured net of direct taxes and state benefits, and are equivalized using the modified 
OECD equivalence scale. Years refer to financial years.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the  Households Below Average Income dataset (which adjusts top incomes for under-
coverage using replacement values from the Survey of Personal Incomes). 
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We contribute to a large literature on trends in inequality in recent decades (other work on the 
UK includes Cowell and Jenkins (1994), Jenkins (1995), Atkinson (1997,1999) and Brewer 
and Wren-Lewis (2016)). In particular we build on Blundell and Etheridge (2010), who 
analyse trends in inequality in different economic outcomes in the UK.  Their analysis, 
however, only covers the period up to 2005, whereas one of the main focuses of this paper – 
and the source of some of the most striking changes – is the Great Recession. Heathcote et al 
(2010) conduct a similar exercise for the US and Krueger et. al. (2010) summarise similar 
work for other advanced economies. This paper also relates to a literature which analyses the 
extent of insurance against labour market shocks provided by the tax and transfer system (e.g. 
Blundell et al (2008); Dolls et al (2012)) and family labour supply (e.g. Blundell et al 
(2016)).  
The most dramatic changes in income inequality in recent British history occurred in the 
1980s. This is shown in Figure 2, which tracks inequality in net equivalized household 
income in Great Britain since comparable data began in 1961. The Gini coefficient rose from 
0.26 in 1980 to 0.34 by 1990, and the 90-10 income ratio rose from 3.2 to 4.4 over the same 
period. Inequality also increased markedly in the US over that period (Cutler and Katz 
(1992)) and, to a lesser extent, in other advanced economies (Gottschalk and Smeeding 
(1997)). The large literature investigating the causes of this rise in inequality concluded that 
rising wage inequality was the key driver in the US, with skill-biased technological change 
typically the favoured major explanation (Levy and Murnane (1992); Katz and Murphy 
(1992); Bound and Johnson (1992); Autor et al (1998)). In Britain, skill-biased technological 
change did result in rising wage inequality (Machin (2001)), but the compounding factors of 
weaker trade unions (Machin (1996), Goodman and Shepherd (2002)) and regressive changes 
to the tax and benefit system (Johnson and Webb (1993)) also contributed to the increase in 
income inequality. 
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Figure 2. The Gini coefficient and 90:10 ratio in Great Britain, 1961 to 2014 
 
Note: The two series in this graph measure inequality in household incomes. Household income is measured net of direct 
taxes and state benefits, and is equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Years refer to calendar years up to 
and including 1992 and to financial years from 1993–94 onwards. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Expenditure Survey (up 1993–94) and Households Below Average Income 
dataset from 1994–95. Top incomes adjusted for under-coverage using replacement values from the Survey of Personal 
Incomes) 
 
Figure 3.  “Top income shares” of household income in Great Britain, 1961 to 2014  
 
Note: Household income is measured net of direct taxes and state benefits, and is equivalized using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale. Years refer to calendar years up to and including 1992 and to financial years from 1993–94 onwards. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Expenditure Survey (up 1993–94) and Households Below Average Income 
dataset from 1994–95. Top incomes adjusted for under-coverage using replacement values from the Survey of Personal 
Incomes) 
This paper investigates in detail what has happened in the UK since the rise in inequality in 
the 1980s, and why. The lack of substantial change in the Gini coefficient over the past two 
decades actually masks two offsetting trends. As Figure 3 shows, the share of income going 
to the highest-income individuals clearly continued to increase (driven almost entirely by the 
growth in the top 1% share), at least until the onset of the Great Recession.  But income 
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inequality has actually fallen across the large majority of the income distribution, as indicated 
by the decline in the 90-10 ratio. 
These contrasting trends, of narrowing inequality across most of the distribution but the 
racing away of the very top (the so-called “new inequality”), have led to two inequality 
literatures that have been largely distinct. Analyses of broad inequality in earnings, income 
and consumption trends across the population tend to use household survey data due to the 
richness of information that they contain on each household (e.g. Aguiar and Bils 2015, 
Fisher et al 2013, Heathcote et al 2010). Meanwhile a “top incomes” literature documents the 
increasing shares of total income accruing to the very top in the UK and elsewhere (Atkinson 
2005, Atkinson et al 2011, Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005, Piketty and Saez 2006, Kaplan 
and Rauh 2010), and a related set of work seeks to explain this phenomenon (e.g. Bell and 
van Reenen 2013 and 2014, Gabaix and Landier 2008, Rosen 1981,). The empirical top 
incomes literature tends to use administrative data sources because of under-coverage of top 
incomes in household surveys. Recent work has sought to integrate these literatures by 
combining data sources (Burkhauser et al, 2016). Continuing in that vein, in a complementary 
analysis Jenkins (2016) examines how trends in incomes at the very top have affected overall 
income inequality. Both of those papers show that top incomes have pulled away to an even 
greater extent than survey-based estimates have captured.  
Here though we focus on the other important, and perhaps more surprising, inequality 
phenomenon – the decline in inequality across the vast majority of the distribution. This does 
disregard the extreme tails, which seem to drive a significant amount of the public and policy 
focus on inequality. But it means that we can use rich survey data to analyse the mechanics of 
inequality change in detail right down to the level of hourly wages. Section I discusses data 
issues and sample selection choices in more detail. Readers who want to know more about 
what has happened to incomes at the very top in the UK should see Jenkins (2016). 
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 The fall in the 90-10 ratio in the UK occurred largely in two distinct episodes, which were 
associated with radically different macroeconomic performance. The first episode, from 
1997–98 to 2004–05, coincided with robust growth in GDP, employment and earnings. The 
second period, since 2007–08, coincided with the Great Recession and its aftermath, with 
falls in employment, output and (particularly) earnings. These episodes of falling income 
inequality (across most of the distribution) were very different to trends seen in the equivalent 
periods in the United States. Meyer and Sullivan (2013) show that after-tax and transfer 
income inequality (the equivalent measure of income to that used in this paper) rose 
significantly during the early 2000s and the Great Recession in the US. From 2000 to 2004, 
the 90-10 ratio rose from 5.3 to almost 5.9 in the US, while it fell from almost 4.2 to under 
4.0 in Britain. From 2007 to 2011, the 90-10 ratio rose from 5.8 to 6.3 in the US but fell from 
4.2 to 3.9 in Britain.  
The difference in trends in household income inequality between the US and UK is not 
explained by trends in male hourly wage inequality. In both countries, wage inequality for 
men has continued to rise, with the 50-10 ratio constant or declining but the 90-50 wage 
ratios continuing to grow (Autor et al (2008); Lindley and Machin (2013)). The fall in income 
inequality across most of the distribution in Britain therefore represents a divergence in the 
trends of male wage inequality and household income inequality, depicted in Figure 4. The 
90-10 ratio for both male wages and household incomes was 4.1 in 1994, but while the 90-10 
ratio in male wages rose to 4.5 by 2014, the 90-10 ratio in incomes fell to 3.9.  
8 
 
Figure 4. 90:10 ratio for male hourly wages and net household income 1994 to 2014 
 
Note: Household incomes have been measured net of direct taxes and state benefits, and are equivalized using the modified 
OECD equivalence scale. Years refer to financial years.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the  Households Below Average Income dataset (which adjusts top incomes for under-
coverage using replacement values from the Survey of Personal Incomes). 
In explaining that divergence, we document a number of facts. Over the last two decades, 
male earnings inequality in Britain has increased.
 
This is partly because of an increase in 
male hourly wage inequality, but also because of a rise in the covariance between male wages 
and hours worked, driven by a fall in the number of hours worked by low-wage men. Female 
earnings inequality has fallen across the vast majority of the distribution as inequality in the 
number of hours worked has fallen. Meanwhile the level of female earnings has caught up to 
a significant degree with the level of male earnings. Taken together, this has led to little 
overall change in individual earnings inequality (with U-shaped growth across the earnings 
distribution), primarily because the catch-up of women acted to offset the increased 
inequality in male earnings. However, the major force holding down individual earnings 
inequality – the catch-up of women - was largely reducing inequalities within rather than 
across households. As a result, household earnings inequality increased, driven largely by the 
higher inequality in male earnings. An increased covariance between the earnings of 
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for working households was one important reason for this, due to both deliberate increases in 
redistribution towards poor families with children and the support provided by the benefits 
system during the large earnings shock associated with the Great Recession. Finally the 
relative improvement in the position of both non-working households of working-age and 
pensioners acted to reduce inequality further over the period: partly also a result of tax and 
benefit reforms, but partly due to rises in private pension income across successive cohorts of 
pensioners.  
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section I discusses the data and methodology. 
Section II explores the patterns underlying changes in inequality in working households’ 
labour income. Section III analyses how taxes, transfers and other unearned income sources 
for the same working households have contributed to inequality trends. Section IV assesses 
how and why the inclusion of non-working households and pensioners affect trends in 
inequality. Section V briefly discusses the prospects for future trends in UK income 
inequality. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The analysis is based on the UK’s Family Resources Survey (FRS). This is a repeated cross-
section containing between 20,000 and 25,000 households in each financial year. It aims to 
capture all the income received by the household, including labour income, the large range of 
state benefits and tax credits, and other unearned income such as that from private pensions 
or dividends. It also records direct taxes paid. These data are collected by the UK 
government’s Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) over the period of a financial year 
(April to the following March).  
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Since 1994–95, the FRS has been used by the UK government to produce official National 
Statistics on average household income, income inequality and poverty. This involves the 
derivation of net income variables from the FRS data (and, to correct for under-coverage of 
top incomes, replacement values derived from administrative tax return data), which are 
published as a dataset known as “Households Below Average Income” (HBAI).1  
The headline measure of income produced in the HBAI datasets is net household equivalized 
income. This sums all the sources of income received by each member of the household, 
deducts direct taxes and adds benefits and tax credits, and then equivalises using the modified 
OECD equivalence scale.
2
 Individuals are the unit of analysis: all individuals (including 
children) are assumed to receive the equivalized household income of the household to which 
they belong. Descriptions of all the samples and the measures of income and earnings used in 
this paper can be found in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
The high quality measures of income components at both the individual and household level 
make the FRS/HBAI data well suited for our purposes. At the time of writing the FRS/HBAI 
data are available from 1994–95 through to 2014–15, so our analysis focuses on this period. 
Given that Northern Ireland was only included in the data from 2002–03 onwards, for 
consistency we drop all households from Northern Ireland in the data and focus on trends in 
Great Britain alone, rather than the UK as a whole. 
We adjust for inflation using a variant of the Consumer Price Index which includes mortgage 
interest payments, as in the official HBAI statistics.
3
 We have also cross-checked our analysis 
of weekly earnings and hourly wages using data from the Labour Force Survey, and found 
very similar patterns.  
As explained in the Introduction, our focus is on explaining movements in inequality across 
most of the distribution and so we disregard the extreme tails. Hence we restrict attention to 
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wages, earnings and incomes between the 5
th
 and 95
th 
percentiles of their respective 
distributions. Note that there is a large amount of overlap (in terms the sample that is used) 
between the middle 90% of the different distributions we use in the analysis.
4
   
This trimming has the advantage of removing those parts of the distribution over which we 
have most reason to be concerned about measurement error. For hourly wages, the fifth 
percentile in 2014–15 is around £4.70, which was about 75% of level of the National 
Minimum Wage.
5
 Towards the very bottom of the household income distribution there is 
little relationship between expenditure and income (except within the bottom 1%, where 
expenditure is actually decreasing in income); and, focusing specifically on the bottom 1%, 
modelling work has ruled out consumption smoothing as the sole cause of this and hence has 
favoured mis-measurement as the major explanation (Brewer, Etheridge and O’Dea, 
(forthcoming).  
At the top of the income distribution, survey data including the FRS are known to under-
record incomes. Jenkins (2016) shows that during the 2000s this under-coverage in the FRS 
tended to apply from approximately the 95
th
 percentile (during the 1990s it was primarily the 
top 1% that was mis-measured). The official HBAI series applies an adjustment to top 
incomes for this reason, and recent work by Burkhauser et. al. (2016) has suggested a 
refinement to the adjustment which reveals ‘there was a marked increase in income inequality 
in the early 2000s that survey-based estimates do not reveal’ However, these adjustments are 
based on replacing incomes at the top with cell-mean values from tax return data. This would 
not be adequate for the purposes of our analysis because we want to drill right down to the 
components of income, and indeed to hourly wages. We do, however, note where our 
findings would be different if we included the very top of the distribution. 
To quantify the contributions of different factors to changes in inequality we use 
decomposition techniques. For this purpose we use three distinct decomposition techniques 
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and three different summary measures of inequality, in order to understand the contribution to 
inequality of multiplicative and additive components of income, and changes within and 
between sub-groups of the population. These are outlined in turn below (see Cowell (2011) 
and Cowell and Fiorio (2011) for more discussion of measurement and decompositions of 
inequality).  
To decompose the change in inequality in weekly earnings as a multiplicative function of 
hours and wages, we take the variance of (natural) log weekly earnings and use the following 
identity:  
                                                                                    [1] 
where   is the hourly wage and   is hours worked per week. 
To decompose inequality in household earnings as the sum of the earnings of the main earner 
and those of additional earners, we can decompose the I2 measure of inequality (half the 
squared coefficient of variation). Denoting household earnings by Y, with mean   and 
variance   , and separating it into two additive components so that           , with   , 
and    the respective means and   
 and   
  their variances, then       can be decomposed in 
the following way: 
                                 
  
   
  
  
 
   
  
  
 
  
   
  
 
   
  
  
 
  
   
          
    
 
    
  
                                          
The first of the three terms captures inequality in the first income source (which in our 
application is the earnings of the main earner), scaled by a measure of the aggregate size of 
that income source relative to total income.  The second term is analogous for the second 
income source (which in our application is the earnings of any additional earners). The third 
term captures the relationship between the two income sources, scaled by a measure of 
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inequality between the two sources. In combination, these terms help us to understand the 
role of changes in inequality of each income source and the covariance between them. 
Finally, we decompose changes in inequality into those changes in inequality within and 
between different groups (such as pensioners and non-pensioners). We use the decomposition 
of the I0 measure of inequality (    
 
 
      
 
  
  , also known as the mean log deviation 
(MLD). Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982) show that the change in the MLD can be 
approximately decomposed into the contributions of changes in inequality ‘within’ groups, 
changes in inequality ‘between’ groups, and changes in the population share of each group: 
                                                                                                                 
where    is the population share of group k,       is the MLD within group k,   is mean 
income (or earnings) in group k,    
  
 
, and        . In all cases, a bar over a variable 
indicates an average of start and end period values. 
 
II. THE LABOUR MARKET AND HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS 
We start by describing trends in inequality in individual employees’ earnings, for men and 
women separately. We initially restrict attention to the earnings of employees of working age. 
This means men below 65 and women below 60, in accordance with the state pension ages 
prior to 2010. Since 2010, the state pension age for women has risen above 60 (see Cribb et al 
2016), but we keep the upper age bound fixed so as to limit compositional changes in the 
sample over time  The lower age bound is 16, or 20 if in full-time education and living at 
home. Of course participation in higher education has increased over the period, which does 
induce some compositional changes in the workforce over time for the youngest adults.  
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We exclude the self-employed while we separate the contributions of changes in hours 
worked and hourly wages, because the measurement and interpretation of hours worked for 
the self-employed is problematic. We do add in self employment income later in the section 
and discuss its effects, though it is worth noting that this is likely to be measured less reliably: 
a large proportion of the self employed report their income for a financial year prior to the 
survey year, and 30% are unable to provide information from accounts prepared for HM 
Revenue and Customs.  
Figure 5 shows average annualized real growth in weekly earnings and hourly wages for men 
and women between 1994 –95 and 2014–15, by percentile point. Three points are evident. 
First, for both hourly wages and weekly earnings, the gap between men and women has 
narrowed: growth for women has been significantly higher than for men (e.g. at the median, 
real wage growth averaged 0.5% per year for men and 1.3% for women). Second, there have 
been increases in wage and earnings inequality for men. Third, there has been a decline in 
inequality in female weekly earnings, driven by particularly large rises in female earnings 
towards the bottom of the distribution. The lack of any noticeable impact of the introduction 
(in 1999) and subsequent increases in the National Minimum Wage on wages towards the 
bottom of the distribution is consistent with Stewart (2012), and is explained by the fact that 
the minimum wage is set at a low level – around the 5th percentile of the wage distribution in 
2013 (see Low Pay Commission 2014) – combined with a lack of “spillovers” onto higher 
percentiles of the distribution.
6
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Figure 5. Weekly earnings and hourly wage growth, men and women, 1994–95 to 
2014–15  
 
Note: Sample contains male/female working age employees. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources 
Survey.   
To understand these changes more rigorously, we decompose the change in the variance of 
(log) weekly earnings into that caused by changes in inequality in hours, that caused by 
changes in inequality in hourly wages and that caused by a change in the covariance between 
hours and wages. Table 1 does this for men and women separately, for the period as a whole 
and four sub-periods (1994 to 1997, 1997 to 2004, 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2014). In 
particular, this allows us to look at the period of “inclusive growth” (1997 to 2004) and since 
the Great Recession (2007 to 2014) separately. All figures are scaled by a factor of 100 for 
the purposes of presentation.  
For men, there have been steady increases in earnings inequality. Increasing inequality in 
male hourly wages was the most important factor, but an increased covariance between hours 
and wages has also played a significant role.  
Table 2 shows that the increase in covariance between male wages and hours was driven by a 
decrease in the hours worked by men with low hourly wages. The average hours worked by 
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men in the second decile of the wage distribution fell by 11.4% between 1994–95 and 2014–
15, with a 14 percentage point increase in the proportion working part-time (under 30 hours a 
week). There was also a increase in hours worked towards the top of the hourly wage 
distribution (a 3.7% increase over the period for the ninth decile). Hence changes along the 
intensive margin of male labour supply (and potentially demand for that labour since the 
recession) have played a more important role in explaining recent changes in inequality than 
one might have expected, given the traditional view that male labour supply varies little along 
the intensive margin.  
Table 1. Decomposition of the change in variance of log earnings ( 100)  
 
 
 Contribution to change  
 Variance of 
log earnings 
at start of 
period 
Change in 
variance of log 
earnings  
Variance of  
log hours 
Variance of 
log wage 
Covariance of log 
hours and log wage 
 
Men 
1994-1997 18.18 2.22 0.74 1.02 0.45 
1997-2004 20.39 2.82 0.29 1.52 1.01 
2004-2007 23.21 0.82 0.06 0.12 0.64 
2007-2014 24.03 2.72 0.26 1.99 0.47 
1994-2014 18.18 8.58 1.35 4.65 2.58 
 
Women 
1994-1997 41.34 -1.57 -0.66 1.83 -2.74 
1997-2004 39.77 -3.99 -3.64 -1.94 1.59 
2004-2007 35.78 -0.77 -0.60 0.28 -0.45 
2007-2014 35.01 -1.77 -0.68 -0.08 -1.01 
1994-2014 41.34 -8.10 -5.57 0.08 -2.60 
Note: Sample contains male/female working age employees earning between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the 
male/female earnings distribution in the year they are observed. Years refer to financial years. Source: Authors’ 
calculations using the Family Resources Survey.   
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Table 2. Change in weekly hours and part-time work across the male hourly wage 
distribution 
 Percentiles: 
1994–95 
to 2014–15 
5
th
 –
10
th
  
10
th
 –
20
th
  
20
th
 –
30
th
  
30
th
 –
40
th
 
40
th
 –
50
th
 
50
th
 –
60
th
  
60
th
 –
70
th
  
70
th
 –
80
th
  
80
th
 –
90
th
 
90
th
 –
95
th
 
All 
%Δ in mean  
hours -11.4% -11.4% -9.0% -6.2% -3.7% -1.7% -1.3% 0.6% 3.7% 3.3% -3.8% 
Δ in % 
working part 
time (ppt) 13.6 14.1 7.6 4.5 3.3 1.8 1.9 2.3 0.5 0.2 4.5 
Note: Sample restricted to male working age employees. “All” only includes 5th to 95th percentiles of male 
hourly wage distribution. Years refer to financial years. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family 
Resources Survey.   
 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that over the same period the variance of log female 
earnings fell, and that this was primarily driven by falls in inequality in the hours worked by 
female employees, which occurred in each sub-period shown. This is an intuitive 
consequence of increasing labour market attachment among women. The proportion of 
female employees working full-time (at least 30 hours per week) rose from 61% in 1994–95 
to 66% in 2014–15. Importantly the fraction of female employees working very low hours 
(under 16 per week) fell from 14% to 6% over the same period. 
When examining men and women together, the changes in inequality in employee earnings 
are rather different to those when looking at men and women separately. Figure 6 shows the 
growth incidence curve for individual employee earnings since 1994–95. Changes in earnings 
inequality overall have been modest, with a U-shaped pattern: growth has been higher in the 
upper and lower parts of the distribution than in the middle. When looking across the middle 
90% of the distribution on which we focus in this paper, the net result is a small fall in 
inequality according to the MLD - though if we were to include the top tail (up to the 99
th
 
percentile) the MLD would suggest an increase.  
Table 3 displays a decomposition of the MLD measure of individual earnings inequality into 
changes within and between men and women (using the methodology described in Section I), 
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with all figures again scaled by a factor of 100 for ease of presentation. Looking across the 
middle 90% of the earnings distribution changes in earnings inequality within sexes acted to  
increase the MLD  by 0.78 (driven by men, as we have seen). However, this was more than 
offset by changes in inequality in earnings between the sexes, which acted to decrease the 
MLD by 1.26. Hence it is the ‘catch up’ of female earnings with male earnings that has held 
down individual earnings inequality in Britain. This is in contrast with the US, where there 
has been little change in the raw ratio between female and male earnings since the early 
1990s, following a significant ‘catch up’ during the 1980s (Heathcote et. al. 2010).  
Table 3. Decomposition of the change in the Mean Log Deviation (x 100) of Earnings by 
sex 
 
 
 
Contribution to change in Mean Log Deviation 
 
MLD at start 
of period 
Overall 
change in 
MLD 
Within 
group 
inequality 
Within group 
- changes in 
population 
share 
Between group 
- changes in 
population 
share 
Between 
group 
inequality 
1994-1997 16.17 -0.08 0.30 -0.05 -0.01 -0.32 
1997-2004 16.09 -0.66 -0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.64 
2004-2007 15.42 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 
2007-2014 15.26 0.46 0.57 0.02 0.00 -0.14 
1994-2014 16.17 -0.45 0.78 0.03 0.00 -1.26 
Note: Sample contains working age employees earning between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the earnings 
distribution in the year they are observed. Years refer to financial years. Source: Authors’ calculations using the 
Family Resources Survey.   
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Figure 6. Growth in individual employee earnings household employee earnings and 
household labour income 1994–95 to 2014–15  
 
Note: For individual earnings, sample contains working age employees earning between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the 
individual earnings distribution. For household earnings, sample contains working age adults in households with at least one 
employee in it, with household earnings between 5th and 95th percentile of the household earnings distribution. For 
household labour income (which includes income from earnings of employees plus any self employment income) the sample 
includes working age adults in households with any labour income (5th to 95th percentiles).  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey.   
 
We now make the critical move from individual-level to household-level measures. Figure 6 
includes the growth incidence curve for household earnings since 1994–95, including all 
working-age adults in a household where at least one individual is an employee. In contrast 
with the U-shaped (and mildly inequality-reducing) pattern of changes in individual earnings 
across most of the distribution, the figure shows that inequality in household earnings has 
clearly risen across most of the distribution over the last 20 years, with the exception of the 
bottom sixth of the distribution.  
Why has household earnings inequality risen while individual earnings inequality has not? 
One possibility is that the forces holding down individual earnings inequality have been 
occurring within, rather than across, households, as women have caught up with men; and 
that once those within-household changes are washed out when looking at the household 
level, the increase in male earnings inequality simply leads to an increase in household 
earnings inequality. Another possibility is that the covariance between the earnings of 
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individuals in the same household has become more important. Table 4 helps to distinguish 
these possible explanations. It decomposes the I2 measure of household earnings inequality 
(as described in equation (2)) in 1994–95 and 2014–15 into the contributions of inequality in 
the earnings of the highest-earning individual in the household (‘main’ earnings), inequality 
in the earnings of other individuals in the household (‘other’ earnings), and the covariance 
between ‘main’ and ‘other’ earnings.  
Table 4: Decomposing inequality in household earnings into parts affected by 
distribution of main earners and other earners  
 
I2 = 
I2 
(main) 
  
     
 
    
  + 
I2 
(other) 
  
      
 
    
  + 
                 
           
   
           
    
  
1994–95 0.134  0.120  0.537  0.698  0.071  0.101  0.196 
2014–15 0.158  0.155  0.493  0.606  0.089  0.132  0.209 
% Change  18%  29%  -8%  -13%  25%  30%  7% 
Note: sample restricted working age individuals in households with at least one employee in it, with household 
earnings between 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of the household earnings distribution. Years refer to financial years. 
“Other earners” refers to the earnings of all employees in the household who are not the individual with the 
highest earnings. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey.   
The increase in household earnings inequality has been driven mainly by an increase in 
inequality in ‘main’ earnings. This reflects the fact that most ‘main’ earners are male, and as 
discussed above, male earnings inequality increased over the period being examined. Had 
only I2 (main) = 
     
 
      
  changed between 1994–95 and 2013–14, inequality in household 
earnings would have risen by around 14% (according to the I2 measure), compared to the 
18% increase recorded. 
An increasing covariance between the earnings of members of the same household also 
played a supporting (but smaller) role in increasing household earnings inequality. The table 
shows that 
                 
           
 increased by 30% over the 20-year period
 
(dividing by the product 
of mean main earnings and mean other earnings gives this term the desirable  property of 
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being invariant to general growth in the level of main or other earnings). If only this change 
had occurred, then (ceteris paribus) household earnings inequality would have risen by 4%.  
Given that the increased covariance of individual earnings within households explains only a 
small portion of the rise in household earnings inequality, the primary reason why individual 
and household earnings inequality have behaved differently seems to be that the catch-up of 
women’s earnings has primarily decreased inequality within, rather than across, households. 
Of course this reduction in within-household inequality is an important development in its 
own right. For couples in the middle 90% of the household earnings distribution, the 
proportion of household earnings coming from women has risen from under 32% in 1994–95 
to 37% in 2014–15.   
Finally, Figure 6 also displays the growth incidence curve for total household labour income. 
This shows that once self-employment incomes (and households with self-employment 
income but no employee earnings) are included, the growth in labour income towards the 
bottom of the distribution looks slower. This is the result of two trends. Self-employment 
incomes at the bottom of the distribution have grown more slowly over the past twenty years 
than employee earnings for households that have both; and there is a growing group of low-
income households whose labour income comes entirely from self-employment (see Tatomir 
2015). In summary, adding in self-employment incomes reinforces our conclusion that 
household labour income inequality has risen. 
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III. TAXES AND UNEARNED INCOME FOR WORKING HOUSEHOLDS 
We have seen that the combined impact of changes in wages and hours for men and women, 
and how these have combined within households, has been an increase in inequality in labour 
income across working households over the past 20 years (and even more so once self-
employment income is included). Yet we know that net income inequality across most of the 
distribution (at least the middle 90%) has fallen over that period. We now show that the tax 
and benefit system is a key explanation for this difference. 
We continue to focus on working households so that the sample of households remains the 
same as at the end of the previous section, although we now include children in working 
households too, and we equivalise using the modified OECD scale to take account of 
different household sizes and compositions. We look at changes in the distribution of gross 
labour income, then gross labour income plus transfers, which includes any cash transfers 
(i.e. benefits and tax credits), then gross income plus transfers, which additionally includes 
any other unearned income (such as dividends or property income), and finally net income, 
which deducts direct taxes and is the “headline” measure of household living standards. Note 
that these measures are all carefully defined in Table A.2. 
Figure 7a shows the growth incidence curves for each of these distributions between 1994–95 
and 2014–15. Looking at the change in the distribution of gross household labour income, we 
can see essentially the same pattern that was observed in Figure 6 (the inclusion of children 
and equivalisation do not have a material effect, as shown in Appendix Figure A.1):  stronger 
growth at higher percentiles of the distribution, with the exception of the bottom 15%.  
The figure shows that this increase in household earnings inequality among working 
households since 1994–95 was largely unwound by the tax and benefit system; and that this 
unwinding was almost entirely the result of cash transfers, which are targeted towards the 
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poorer half of working households. Changes in other unearned income have had very little 
impact on inequality among working households, and while direct taxes were a moderate 
force for inequality reduction (as would typically be expected due to fiscal drag), their impact 
on inequality trends was less dramatic.  
The role of cash transfers paid to working households in driving inequality trends over the 
past two decades was largely the result of two very different episodes, shown separately in 
Figures 7b and 7c.  First, there was a large deliberate increase in fiscal redistribution in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, whose effects are evident in Figure 7b. This redistribution was 
particularly focused towards low-income families with children, occurring through the rapid 
expansion of the tax credit system with the introduction of Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC) in 1999 to replace its smaller-scale predecessor Family Credit, and then WFTC’s 
replacement with the more generous system of Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit in 
2003. As a result of these changes, spending on tax credits trebled as a share of GDP between 
1997 and 2004, from 0.5% to 1.5%.
7
 For more details on these policy changes, see Hills 
(2013). These policies, and their relationship to the ambitious child poverty targets that the 
Labour government of the time was pursuing, have been discussed and analysed in detail 
elsewhere (e.g. Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). The result was that the bottom 40% of the 
distribution of working households saw larger proportional growth in net income than in 
gross labour income over the period, while the opposite was true of the top 60%. Note that 
behavioural effects played a part too: there is evidence that the tax credit reforms 
significantly increased employment, particularly among lone parents (Harkness and Gregg, 
2003; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004).  
The second episode that stands out is the period since the Great Recession shown in Figure 
7c. While there were some further discretionary increases in the generosity of cash transfers 
for working households during this period, much of their effect on inequality here can be 
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explained by the fact that they act as an insurance mechanism against shocks to earnings. 
Sharp labour market adjustments associated with the recession in the UK came particularly 
through falls in real earnings among those in work (rather than the employment rate, which 
fell from 2007–08 to 2011–12 but grew strongly afterwards). Towards the bottom of the 
distribution these were cushioned to a large degree by cash transfers: low-earning households 
get far less of their income from earnings, and far more from price-indexed benefits, than 
higher-earning households. Belfield et. al. (2015) show that in 2013–14 cash transfers made 
up nearly 60% of net household income in the bottom decile of the household earnings 
distribution and around a third in the second decile, but less than 5% across the top half of the 
distribution.  
Figure 7a. Household income growth for working households 1994–95 to 2014–15  
 
Note: Sample contains all individuals who are not pensioners (including children) living in a household with at least one 
person in work. All measures of income are equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Source: Authors’ calculations using 
the Family Resources Survey.   
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Figure 7b. Household income growth for working households 1997–98 to 2004–05 
 
Note: Sample contains all individuals who are not pensioners (including children) living in a household with at least one 
person in work. All measures of income are equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Source: Authors’ calculations using 
the Family Resources Survey.   
 
Figure 7c. Household income growth for working households 2007–08 to 2014–15 
 
Note: Sample contains all individuals who are not pensioners (including children) living in a household with at least one 
person in work. All measures of income are equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Source: Authors’ calculations using 
the Family Resources Survey.   
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IV. NON-WORKING HOUSEHOLDS AND PENSIONERS 
So far the analysis has focussed on households of working age who have someone in paid 
work. Now we show the impact that trends in the incomes of other households have had on 
overall inequality in net household incomes. We do this in two steps: examining the effect of 
trends for non-working households of working age, and then including pensioners (defined 
here as women aged 60 and over and men aged 65 and over). 
Table 5 shows subgroup decompositions of changes in the MLD over the past 20 years, 
focusing only on non-pensioners and splitting them into two subgroups depending on whether 
or not they live in a working household. The bottom row takes the whole period between 
1994–95 and 2014–15. It shows that a narrowing of the gap between working and non-
working households (as indicated by the “between group inequality” column) has been a 
further driver of inequality reduction. The narrowing has occurred largely since the Great 
Recession, as one would expect given the sharp falls in real earnings alongside the price-
indexation of most benefits, which account for most of the income of non-working 
households. However, the gap also narrowed in the late 1990s and early 2000s (despite fast 
earnings growth over that period), as generous discretionary increases in benefits had more 
effect on the mean income of non-working households than the mean income of working 
households.  
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Table 5. Decomposition of Mean Log Deviation (x 100) in household income for non-
pensioners: working and non-working households 
 
 
 
Contribution to change in Mean Log Deviation 
 
MLD at start 
of period 
Overall 
change in 
MLD 
Within 
group 
inequality 
Within group - 
changes in 
population 
share 
Between group 
- changes in 
population 
share 
Between 
group 
inequality 
1994-1997 9.85 0.07 0.36 0.04 -0.21 -0.13 
1997-2004 9.92 -0.64 -0.25 0.04 -0.22 -0.21 
2004-2007 9.28 0.73 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.15 
2007-2014 10.02 -1.00 -0.54 0.01 -0.02 -0.45 
1994-2014 9.85 -0.83 0.13 0.12 -0.41 -0.68 
Note: Sample contains all non-pensioners between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the non-pensioner household 
income distribution. Years refer to financial years. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources 
Survey.   
Alongside this narrowing of the income gap between working and non-working households, 
there was also a fall in household worklessness, particularly in the first decade of the period: 
the proportion of non-pensioners living in households with no one in work fell from 17.3% in 
1994–95 to 13.2% in 2004–05. This trend was particularly marked among lone parent 
households and, as highlighted above, was caused (at least in part) by behavioural responses 
to tax credit reforms (see Blundell and Hoynes 2004). The table shows that this fall in 
household worklessness acted to reduce net income inequality among the non-pensioner 
population: as the share of the population living in a workless household fell, inequality 
between workless and working households made less of a contribution to overall inequality  
(as captured by the penultimate column of Table 5). 
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Table 6. Decomposition of Mean Log Deviation (x 100) in household income: Pensioners 
and Non-Pensioners  
 
 
 
Contribution to change in Mean Log Deviation 
 
MLD at start 
of period 
Overall 
change in 
MLD 
Within 
group 
inequality 
Within group - 
changes in 
population 
share 
Between group - 
changes in 
population 
share 
Between 
group 
inequality 
1994-1997 9.78 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
1997-2004 9.86 -0.75 -0.69 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 
2004-2007 9.10 0.74 0.77 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
2007-2014 9.84 -1.09 -0.89 -0.02 0.01 -0.19 
1994-2014 9.78 -1.03 -0.70 -0.02 0.02 -0.32 
Note: Sample contains all individuals between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of the household income distribution. 
Years refer to financial years. Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey.   
Table 6 shows a final set of subgroup decompositions of changes in the MLD, now covering 
the whole population and splitting that population into pensioner and non-pensioner 
individuals. Reductions in within-group inequality were important in driving down 
inequality, but a reduction in income differences between pensioner and working-age 
households has also played a role – and to a greater degree since the Great Recession. Before 
the Great Recession the ‘catch-up’ of pensioners largely reflected a long-running secular 
increase in private pension provision and in entitlements to state pensions across successive 
cohorts of pensioners – driven in part by policy change and in part by more complete 
employment histories during the working-age years for successive cohorts, especially among 
women (for further details and discussion see Hood and Joyce, 2013 and Cribb et al, 2013b). 
Since the Great Recession it also reflects the fact that pensioners were typically not directly 
affected by the sharp falls in real earnings, and in fact their state pension entitlements were 
made more generous rather than less.  
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V. FUTURE TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 
There are two reasons to think at least some of the fall in inequality caused by the Great 
Recession was temporary. First, the most direct driver of the fall in inequality was the fact 
that the recession was associated with large falls in workers’ earnings, which comprise more 
of household income for higher-income households. Hence, if some of the large earnings 
shock associated with the Great Recession in the UK was temporary, then the part of the 
reduction in inequality that it caused will be temporary too. Second, because a significant 
portion of the shock to national income looks likely to have been permanent, the Great 
Recession caused (and/or revealed) a large structural deficit in the UK government’s public 
finances which at some stage needed to be addressed – at least, this is the assumption made 
by the Office for Budget Responsibility (Riley and Chote, 2014), the UK government’s 
official fiscal watchdog. Both the Coalition (2010-2015) and Conservative (2015-) 
governments have chosen to repair that hole in the public finances partly by reducing the 
generosity of the benefits system, particularly for low-income families with children. This is 
itself a (partial) reversal of the increase in support for this group between 1997 and 2004 
which, while inequality reducing, seems to have been deemed unsustainable by subsequent 
governments in light of what we know now about the public finances.  Essentially this 
reflects the fact that insurance against shocks to households’ living standards provided by the 
tax and transfer system structurally weakens the public finances – rather than simply acting as 
an automatic stabiliser over the economic cycle - when part of the adverse shock is 
permanent rather than temporary.   
However, at the time of writing it seems likely that the UK is experiencing its next 
macroeconomic shock in light of the referendum vote to leave the European Union. This 
could have its own set of important consequences for the labour market, tax and benefit 
policy, and income inequality. This would come whilst the fiscal consolidation to repair the 
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damage to the public finances done by the Great Recession is still ongoing (though those 
plans may be changed), and possibly before we have returned to trend output. Given the high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the macroeconomic outlook and government policy, future 
trends in income inequality are very hard to predict. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed changes in earnings and income inequality in Britain over the last 
twenty years. Focussing on the middle 90% of the distribution we have shown that household 
earnings inequality has risen and yet net household income inequality has fallen.  
The rise in household earnings inequality has been the product of a complex set of 
interactions between trends in hours and wages for men and women, but it is largely due to a 
rise in male earnings inequality. This in turn was driven by an increase in the covariance 
between male wages and hours (mostly because low-wage men have seen a reduction in their 
hours of work) and an increase in male hourly wage inequality. Female earnings inequality 
has actually fallen, as inequality in hours worked has fallen. A big catch-up of female 
earnings with male earnings has held down individual earnings inequality (despite the 
increase in inequality in male earnings), and importantly has reduced within-household 
inequality. But because that catch-up of women largely reduced inequality within households 
rather than across households,  inequality in household earnings inequality still increased, due 
primarily to the inequality-increasing trends in male earnings. An increased covariance 
between the earnings of adults in the same household also contributed. 
There are several reasons why net income inequality across the vast majority of the 
distribution has fallen, despite the increased household earnings inequality. Cash transfers for 
low-earning working households rose relative to earnings - particularly during 1997 to 2004, 
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which saw large real increases in cash transfers, and since the recession, when transfers grew 
at least in line with prices and earnings fell in real terms. The increase in the relative 
generosity of cash transfers also boosted the relative incomes of non-working households of 
working age, narrowing inequality between them and working households. There was also a 
reduction in the proportion of people living in workless households. Finally, increases in 
private pension provision and in entitlements to state pensions has led to a sustained increase 
in the relative position of pensioners, who were previously a relatively poor group.  
Overall, as is well known, changes in inequality since the mid 1990s have been on a smaller 
scale than the sharp increases seen in the 1980s. But this paper has shown that this was the 
result of various important and partially-offsetting underlying changes. Male earnings 
inequality has increased significantly; there has been a large decrease in the difference 
between the earnings of men and women; there have been large falls in the proportion of 
people living in workless households; and pensioner income growth has outpaced that of the 
working-age population. These trends represent key changes in inequalities in their own right, 
despite the fact that, together, they have led to relatively moderate changes in overall 
household income inequality.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A.1. Household income growth for working households 1994–95 to 2014–15 
 
Note: Sample contains all individuals who are not pensioners (including children) living in a household with at least one 
person in work. All measures of income are equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Source: Authors’ calculations using 
the Family Resources Survey. 
 
Table A.1 Sample Definitions 
Term Definition 
Working-age 
 
Aged at least 16 (unless they are aged 16-19, living at home 
and are in full time education) and aged under 65 for men 
and under 60 for women 
Working age 
Employees 
Working-age individuals with strictly positive gross 
employee earnings  
Employed Households All households which contain at least one employee 
Working Households All households which contain an employee or self-employed 
adult. Self-employed adults are those with strictly positive 
self-employment income 
Working-age 
Households 
Households containing at least one individual of working-
age 
All Households All private households in Great Britain. 
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Table A.2 Definitions of measures of earnings and income 
Variable Definition Table/Figures used in  
Hourly wages Individual gross earnings per hour of 
employees  
Figures 4,5; Tables 1 and 2 
Individual 
(weekly) earnings 
Individual gross earnings per week of 
employees  
Figures 5, 6; Tables 1 and 3 
Household 
earnings 
Gross earnings from all employees in 
a household  
Figure 6; Table 4 
Household labour 
income 
Gross household income from 
employment or self-employment  
Figure 6 
Gross labour 
income 
Equivalized gross household income 
from employment or self-employment  
Figures 7a,7b,7c 
Gross labour 
income plus 
transfers 
Equivalized gross household labour 
income plus state benefits and tax 
credits  
Figures 7a,7b,7c 
Gross income plus 
transfers 
Total equivalized household income 
including state benefits and tax credits 
(before deducting direct taxes) 
Figures 7a,7b,7c 
Net (household) 
income 
Total equivalized household income 
including state benefits and tax credits, 
after deducting direct taxes  
Figures 1,2,3,4, 7a, 7b,7c;   
Tables 5,6 
 
 
Table A.3 Sample sizes 
 Male 
employee
s 
Female 
employees All employees 
Employed 
Household
s 
Working 
Household
s 
Working 
age 
Households 
All 
Households 
1994–95 10,995 10,562 21,557 13,707 14,748 19,275 26,205 
1997–98 10,535 9,983 20,518 12,771 13,784 17,481 23,436 
2004–05 12,249 12,203 24,452 15,326 16,422 20,625 27,969 
2007–08 10,683 10,709 21,392 13,440 14,442 18,120 24,910 
2014–15 7,861 7,756 16,587 10,245 11,133 13,690 19,468 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Family Resources Survey. 
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NOTES 
1. For methodological details regarding the creation of these data, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/households-below-average-income-hbai--
2.  
2. The equivalence scale expresses all incomes as equivalents for a childless couple. The 
modified OECD equivalence scale is 0.67 for the first adult in the household, 0.33 for 
any additional adult or child aged 14 and over, and 0.20 for any child aged under 14. 
3. This measure of inflation is produced by the UK’s Office for National Statistics for 
the Department for Work and Pensions. The deflator used in this analysis can be 
found at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/bn19figs_2016.xlsx.   
4. For example, of the male employees in the middle 90% of the male hourly wage 
distribution, 98% of them are in the middle 90% of the net household income 
distribution. The equivalent fraction for female employees is 99%.  
5. Analysis using hourly wages often trims hourly wages at a fraction of the minimum 
wage. For example, Attanasio et al (2015) drop individuals with wages measured to 
be less than three quarters of the minimum wage in the US.  
6. The minimum wage is even less important when understanding changes in household 
income inequality. The minimum wage does less to boost net incomes towards the 
bottom of the distribution than in the middle, as those with the lowest hourly wages 
are not necessarily living in the poorest households and they often lose much of their 
additional earnings due to the high effective marginal tax rates faced by those on in-
work benefits (Elming et al 2015). 
7. See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/benefit-expenditure-tables 
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